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Abstract
The network complexity problem within computer security incident response is an
issue pertaining to the complexity of a computer network as it grows in both size and
scale. The larger the computer network grows, the more difficult reconnaissance
becomes, which is necessary to execute correction and prevention measures that
address issues that arise during security incident response. Leveraging graph
databases can help solve problems present in relational databases with large, tree-like
structures, like those present in computer networks, and along with solving those
problems adds flexibility that is needed due to the mutability of computer networks. This
paper focuses on using graph databases to discover the blast radius of day zero
vulnerabilities on the fly by using the properties of graph databases to find intuitive
infection vectors that may be present during a day zero vulnerability. Additionally,
options for visualizing security data in ways that make the data more actionable will be
explored.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Introduction
Computer security incident response (SIR or CSIR) is a must for any large
organization that touches modern technology; in today’s day and age, that is almost all
of them. The larger an organization grows, the bigger its networking and computing
overhead becomes, and the harder it gets to perform security incident response tasks.
The main idea behind this is that, in general, more complicated the computer network
results in more difficulty in performing security incident response tasks due to the highly
unique relationship between different computer networks within a business.
Solving the complexity issue with this problem begins to be apparent when
looking at how a security incident response is handled in a general sense. If a CSIR
event occurs, the first step is often tracking down the computer, server, or system
affected by the event before determining how the device was infected. The resulting
question of who within the network is also potentially vulnerable to this CSIR event and
might be a potential risk for the event spreading to another computer or internal network
is a much larger and more complicated question to answer than the first. Much like the
facial or object recognition problem in computer science, the problem of predicting the
impact and reach of a CSIR event is a particularly challenging problem.
One of the best real-world examples of the problems faced by large networks
and CSIR events is in the case of ransomware. The initial threat vector may be
identified easily, but where the ransomware may be able to spread once within the
network is much harder to work out. Examples of this threat can be seen in the
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WannaCry (2017) and Petya (S., 2017) attacks, where large numbers of computers
both inside and outside of large organizations were compromised. Remedying this
challenge relies on having a solution in place that can make determining the blast radius
of these events quick and painless. This way, the organization’s defenses can be
modified to protect against the threat and prevent proliferation to other segments of the
network.
Solving this problem can be broken into two main parts: constructing and
maintaining a data pool and visualizing the data so that it is actionable. Constructing
and maintaining the data pool consists of gathering and maintaining security data
relevant to that organization’s network (e.g. IP addresses, domain information, DNS
information, and other relevant data). Accessing and using that data is a large part of
addressing CSIR events, even though it often does not paint a readable, easy-tounderstand picture of the affected devices and the problem itself. Visualizing that data is
another problem, as there is a multitude of methods for visualizing the data so that it is
understandable as well as actionable.
Problem Statement
Complex computer networks lead to large amounts of reconnaissance when a
CSIR event occurs. This often requires the use of multiple skilled personnel ranging
from server teams, Windows and Linux specialized teams, networking, firewall, and
more depending on the type of CSIR event. Each of these teams will spend time
working on different aspects of the problem presented by the CSIR event requiring their
expertise. The time spent doing reconnaissance results in slower response times, which
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are critical during times when zero-day vulnerabilities are found exposed within the
network.
Nature and Significance of the Problem
Addressing the computer networking problem is a large task requiring the
integration of cross-discipline data into an easy-to-access structure that can be
leveraged by CSIR teams during CSIR events. This structure must also be actionable
and understood by other teams that may be recruited to help solve CSIR events.
Leveraging the properties of graph databases allows for quick analysis of potentially
vulnerable network segments and can be used to reduce the reconnaissance time
needed during a zero-day vulnerability disclosure. Along with helping to reduce
reconnaissance times, graph databases have a plethora of visualization integrations
available to help produce easily interpreted visuals that condense security data into an
understandable format.
Objective of the Study
The objective of this study is to create a method that leverages an existing
framework for mapping network topology, relationships, and security vulnerability data,
as well as extending the method to help reduce reconnaissance times during zero-day
vulnerability response. Additionally, an exploration of visualization options available for
graph data and available frameworks to create those visualizations will also be
explored.
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Hypotheses
Given a graph database’s ability to select nodes and edges based on a specific
set of criterion, it should be possible to select and modify specific nodes that would be
affected by a zero-day vulnerability, modify their relevant information within the graph
database, and run queries that elucidate the potential infection vectors possible from the
given zero-day.
Limitations of the Study
One major limitation of this study is that sufficient real-world network data is
difficult to programmatically plug into a graph database and access. As a result, a mock
architecture was used and some of the nuances present in real-world networks may be
abstracted. One such example can be seen in the bloat from legacy software and other
compounding decisions that build on themselves. In the test set up used in this study,
there is no legacy software or architecture choices that affect the network and
subsequently the graph.
Another limitation is the scope of zero-day vulnerabilities to choose from and test
against in the test network. Each vulnerability needs its corresponding vulnerable node
to be tagged with the relevant vulnerability information. This is not the case when
reading into a graph database from existing sources, as the information is already
stored within the existing data source and is simply copied over. In this study, one zeroday is simulated due to the overhead required for adding node data and other relevant
information unique to each zero-day.
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The visualization options available will be analyzed from a potential use
standpoint with the goal being to outline the available options and their use cases, the
methods for populating those visualization options, their particular dependencies, and
their available integrations with the graph database chosen in this paper, Neo4j.
Definition of Terms
CSIR–computer security incident response–Generally, the response team
reacts to security issues relating most often to malware, viruses, trojans, ransomware,
or other methods that could lead to the compromise of a company’s data, systems, or
personnel. The CSIR team is responsible for addressing, mitigating, reporting, and
repairing the damage caused by the aforementioned security incidents.
CVE–common vulnerabilities and exposures–Refers to a known weakness in
existing software, hardware, or computer device that could potentially be used to
circumvent intended operating methods. CVE utilizes a scale ranging from innocuous to
extremely dangerous.
Blast Radius–Used to describe how far reaching an infection or attack is on the
computer network.
The Network Problem–The larger a computer network gets, the more difficult it
is to narrow down the problems and connections present within that network. An easy to
understand example is looking at virtualization. Many web servers hosted on virtual
machines may be tied back to and hosted on one physical server. If one of those virtual
machines is compromised, it may be necessary to include the physical server itself as a
potential victim when considering the blast radius of a CSIR incident.
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Summary
In this section, the network problem that is faced by CSIR teams is introduced
and the hurdles met by CSIR teams in addressing that problem are made apparent. In
the next chapter, we review literature pertaining to some of the key components
involved in solving the network problem, mainly focusing on graph databases and other
works addressing parts of the network problem and using graph databases to solve it.
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Chapter 2: Background and Literature Review
Introduction
In this section, we look to provide a brief overview of graph databases followed
by an analysis of the overhead present in attacking the networking problem using
relational databases compared with their graph counterparts. From there, we will look at
how the network problem in a CSIR lens is addressed in a paper presented by Noel,
Harley, Tam, and Gyor (2014) before introducing data visualization and the various
methods of doing aforementioned data visualization. From there, it is possible to move
forward to creating a method for addressing zero-day vulnerabilities using the
framework provided by the aforementioned authors.
Background Related to the Problem
In-depth coverage of the specific kinds of graph databases available for use and
their differences has been covered at length by Angles (2012). Similarly, the differences
between those available graph databases from a design perspective and outlines for
specific use cases are defined by Buerli (2012). In their paper Buerli (2012) does an
excellent job explaining the structural differences present in the various graph
databases in the following paragraph:
Rather, each graph database is optimized for a specific set of task or queries.
The problem resides in the multiple divisions of graph databases. Graph
databases can focus on graph algorithms like shortest path queries and
subgraph matching which require the whole graph to reside in memory and make
distributed systems very difficult. On the other side of the spectrum, a graph
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database can focus on handling large graphs by scaling horizontally. This
however makes many graph algorithms extremely inefficient or even impossible.
Graphs can also focus on either online querying where low latency is required, or
offline querying where larger data is handled. (p. 3)
The above paragraph shows that the choice of graph database should match the
use case required of that graph database. The framework relating to addressing the
network problem designed and outlined by Noel et al. (2014) uses Neo4j. This choice is
a good fit for their framework as Neo4j is “very efficient in graph traversals” (Buerli,
2012). Along with efficient traversals, Neo4j has a few other important features needed
for their framework, which can be seen in Angles’ Table 1 (2012) below:
Table 1
Comparison of Graph Database Features

Note: Reprinted from A comparison of current graph database models, by
Angles. Retrieved from 2012 IEEE 28th International Conference on Data
Engineering Workshops (pp. 171-177) Copyright 2012 by IEEE.

17
In this table, we can see Neo4j is an attributed graph and most importantly is
capable of labeling nodes, attributes, edges, and edge attributes. All of these can be
used to better outline the network being defined within the database. The key
advantage Neo4j has over similarly attributed graphs like DEX, InfinitGraph, and Sones
is that Neo4j is transactional and thus lends itself well to larger applications and
organizations where multiple users may be utilizing it simultaneously.
The network problem as briefly described above will be analyzed further in the
following paragraphs. To again briefly summarize the problem, the initial infection vector
or cause of the CSIR event needs to be investigated when a CSIR event occurs.
Investigating this problem can prove to be problematic when a network is of sufficient
size and complexity. Following off the example of the network problem within the
definition of terms, we can extend this example to help elucidate further hidden
problems presented by the network problem. In the above example, a web server
hosted on a virtual machine was compromised and the physical hardware hosting that
virtual machine was found. Most organizations will have a relational database or a
drawn network diagram that keeps track of the hierarchy of ownership so that tracking
down what infrastructure is used by a specific application is fairly easy to find.
The problem, however, becomes apparent when asking “What other applications
similar to the compromised host live in a space that could potentially lead to their
compromise?” is necessary. The structure of the relational database is effective for
cases where there is a need to find one instance of a hardware server owning a virtual
machine, or the virtual machine owning a web server. When we add in more complex
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questions like needing to know what hardware owns web servers or virtual machines
and has a valid network connection to the compromised system that was first identified
there is a massive failure due to the complexity of the question. Even more so the
problems become more apparent when the levels of the ownership tree above vary in
depth. In the above example of hardware → virtual machine → web server, we only
have a depth two search required, but many situations call for much more depth in the
search such as in a case where: network hardware → physical host hardware → virtual
machine host → virtual machine → docker container. Going past a parent-child depth
relationship of four leads to nearly unresolvable search times in relational databases as
can be seen in Table 2 from Robinson, Webber, and Emil (2015) below.
Table 2
Comparison of Relational and Graph Database Execution Times

Note: Reprinted from Graph Databases by Robinson, Webber, & Emil,
Retrieved from the book Graph Databases Copyright 2015 O’Reilly &
Associates.

This failure is the first issue that crops up in the network problem and is a difficult
problem for relational databases to solve. This problem is difficult due to the number of
table joins that are needed to be performed along with the number of tree traversals
required to answer the aforementioned question. It can be seen above that just due to
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the nature of the tree traversals required relational databases have a difficult time
addressing just the parent-child relationships present in the hardware finding portion of
the question above. To then take that information and cross-reference it with a network
diagram or network devices table constructed within a relational database is another
slow task that may require tree traversal down a hierarchy of networking devices. Again,
here we hit a depth problem and need to be careful about asking questions that require
tree traversals that exceed a depth of four. As we can see the questions asked by CSIR
teams can possibly be answered by a relational database, but there are glaring
problems present when the depth exceeds four. This happens to be the case in most
large organizations and as such makes leveraging a relational database for CSIR
events difficult.
A potential solution to the problems presented above is the graph database.
Graphs are defined as: “Formally, a graph is just a collection of vertices and edges—or,
in less intimidating language, a set of nodes and the relationships that connect them.”
(Robinson et al., 2015) An example of a simple graph structure present in a social
media situation can be seen below in Figure 1:
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Figure 1. Simple example of nodes, edges, & relationships (Robinson et al., 2015).
This simple example above can be a useful tool for understanding one of the
most important features of a method used by many graph databases to perform faster
searches. The tool those particular graph databases use is something called index-free
adjacency. The basic idea is that each node has a pointer stored within it that points to
nodes it is related to. From the above graph, we can understand there would be
pointers from Harry to Ruth and from Ruth to Billy, but there would be no pointer in the
reverse case from Billy to Ruth. In order to resolve that relationship, we would need to
resolve the pointer from Billy to Harry and then from Harry to Ruth. Since the
information of who is connected to who is tied directly to the node, no index is required
to gather that information and instead it is based solely off of information that is
gathered based on adjacency. Since indexing is not used traversing depths becomes
much easier and faster when compared with a relational database. As such, it can be
seen how a graph database addresses one of the key concerns for solving the network
problem as depths over four do not take infeasible amounts of time since graph
databases use index-free adjacency.
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Another problem potentially addressed by graph databases is converting a
network or application diagram into a format useable by a graph database. When using
a relational database this can be a complicated process involving table creation and
normalization. We can avoid this entirely with a graph database and take our
whiteboard drawing of the network or application and import it into the graph database
directly. A sample of an application diagram from Robinson et al. (2015) can be seen
below:

Figure 2. Example application diagram and supporting architecture (Robinson et al.,
2015).
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Taking this whiteboard sketch for the application and transforming it into a graph
database would simply result in a nearly identical layout but populated with metadata
pertaining to the application. This idea from Robinson et al. (2015) can be seen below.

Figure 3. Post transformation to graph database application diagram (Robinson et al.,
2015).
The beauty of the graph database is that the application owner knows where
things are, but it can easily be queried and manipulated by someone seeking
information who isn’t the app owner. Similar data centers can be added to the graph
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and connected to each other nodes and edges based on their relationships to the
others. In this way, it is possible to see the relations between different deployments and
makes their corresponding dependencies clearer.
The full evolution of solving this problem in a CSIR context can be seen in the
framework presented by Noel et al. (2014). In figures 4, 5, and 6 from their paper shown
below:

Figure 4. Cross domain exploit chains leveraging existing vulnerabilities (Noel et al.,
2014).
We can see a simple domain layout, the computers on that domain and their
respective vulnerabilities. Figure 4 is then inserted into Neo4j and is shown in Noel et al.
(2014) Figure 5 below:
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Figure 5. Post transformation to graph database format (Noel et al., 2014)
From this database, it is possible to run queries based on relationships within the
graph. The following query is used by Noel et al. (2014) to find “all paths of exploitable
vulnerabilities between a particular pair of machines: “
MATCH path=
(start:Machine{name:'Machine 1.1'})
-[r:LAUNCHES|VICTIM|IN*]→
(end:Machine{name:'Machine 3.1'})
RETURN path
Resulting in the following Figure 6 depicting any existing paths between machine 1.1
and machine 3.1:

25

Figure 6. Subgraph generated via query of example cross domain exploit chain (Noel et
al., 2014).
From this generated graph we can see how it is possible for machine 1.1 to
reach machine 3.1 through use of various exploits. Below is a walk-through of the
various exploits used to eventually reach machine 3.1:
1.1 → 1.2 (same domain can exploit without issue)
1.2 → 2.2 (exploit nodes are holes in the firewall allowing cross-domain
exploitation)
2.2 → 2.1 (same domain exploit)
2.1 → 3.1 (exploit to domain 3 across a hole in firewall).
With the basics of the framework provided by Noel et al. (2014) outlined it can be
used as the basis for a methodology to discover the blast radius of a zero-day
vulnerability given enough information about the infection vector.
Data visualization can be seen above in various forms in Figures four, five, and
six. These visualizations are excellent options for their particular data sets small size but
will soon fail when scaled up in size due to the lack of data condensation. In domains
with hundreds or thousands of machines, it’s possible for many of those machines to be
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infected during a zero-day disclosure and as such the visualizations in Figure four, five,
and six quickly begin to fail as large sets of data appear and overwhelm the
visualization capabilities of those visualizations. This necessitates different kinds of
graph visualizations for these scenarios as well as provides a good place for introducing
different concepts and categories that pertain to data visualization. Some of the main
benefits of data visualization are covered in Data Visualizations (2011) written by Noah
Iliinsky and Julie Steele. In this book they introduce some of the core benefits of data
visualization below in the following bulleted list:
•

Visualization leverages the incredible capabilities and bandwidth of the visual
system to move a huge amount of information into the brain very quickly.

•

Visualization takes advantage of our brains’ built-in “software” to identify
patterns and communicate relationships and meaning.

•

Visualization can inspire new questions and further exploration.

•

Visualization helps to identify sub-problems.

•

Visualization is excellent for identifying trends and outliers, discovering or
searching for interesting or specific data points in a larger field, etc.
(Iliinsky & Steele, 2011).

Each point within the above list highlights and applies to the CSIR problem in a
fairly straight forward and intuitive way. The first bullet shows how the size problem that
can occur in larger organizations can be addressed quite well by a proper visualization
of CSIR data to help quickly arm CSIR first responders with data pertaining to a newly
disclosed zero-day vulnerability. The second bullet highlights how the brain can often
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digest and interpret a visualization better and more quickly than it can raw data that
would be provided by an SQL query. The third bullet hints to uses for visualizations that
might lead to questions assisting in the prevention and remediation of a potentially
similar zero-day. The fourth bullet is quite relevant to CSIR as many problems have
sub-problems that are hard to identify and using visualizations to potentially identify
those sub-problems is quite the boon. The final bullet point is perfect for CSIR incidents
as often the key requirements are identifying trends and searching for specific data
points in a larger field.
With the basics of data visualization introduced as well as the benefits of various
options available for integration with Neo4j can then be shown. The list of options from
the Neo4j website in their graph visualization tools section is as follows:
Directly embeddable libraries.
•

Neovis.js

•

Popoto.js

Embeddable libraries without direct connection.
•

D3.js

•

Vis.js

•

Sigma.js

•

Vivagraph.js

•

Cytoscape.js

Standalone tools.
•

GraphXR
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•

yFiles

•

Linkurious

•

Graphistry

•

Perspectives

•

Keylines

(Neo4j, 2018)
Each of these tools has advantages and disadvantages that will be briefly
introduced and covered.
Directly embeddable libraries.
Neovis.js. The brief description from Neo4j is as follows,
“Customizing and coloring styles based on labels, properties, nodes, and
relationships is defined in a single configuration object. Neovis.js can be used
without writing Cypher and with minimal JavaScript for integrating into your
project.” (Neo4j, 2018)
Neovis integrates with Neo4j and creates a customized and colored graph using
a configuration object that takes data defined on those nodes and their relationships to
create the corresponding visualization. The example visualization on the Neo4j site
using Neovis.js can be seen below:
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Figure 7. Example visualization method based on game of thrones relationships (Lyon,
2016; Neo4J, 2018).
The above figure helps provide a better understanding between the various
related nodes, the size of their relationships, and the domains they belong to as
identified by the walktrap method. In this case, the example is game of thrones
characters and their relationships. The following quote explicitly defines the various
properties and their meaning within the visualization:
“The graph of thrones. Node size is proportional to betweenness centrality, colors
indicate the cluster of the node as determined by the walktrap method, and the
edge thickness is proportional to the number of interactions between two
characters.” (Lyon, 2016)
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Applying the above graph representation to a network and computer domain
would result in a similar data visualization to the game of thrones visualization above,
though it may suffer from the vast number of devices present on a large network if not
condensed before representation using Neovis.js.
Popoto.js. This library is based on the D3.js library and serves as a tool for
assisting in query generation within Neo4j. As far as visualizations are concerned it
does not provide anything revolutionary but does serve as a great tool for introducing
users to the Cypher query language. Acting as a simple visual query builder an example
can be seen below from the Popoto.js website:

Figure 8. Example visual query builder for graph data (Popoto.js, 2018)
D3.js. The brief introduction from Neo4j introduces D3.js as the following:
“As the first line on D3’s website states ‘D3.js is a JavaScript library for
manipulating documents based on data.’ You can bind different kinds of data to a
DOM and then execute different kinds of functions on it. One of those functions
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includes generating an SVG, canvas, or HTML visualization from the data in the
DOM.” (Neo4j, 2018)
Some of the examples on the Neo4j site leverage D3.js as a tool for producing
their visualizations. Since D3.js is not Neo4j integrated it requires the data set to be
exported in a format compatible with the D3.js visualization being used. Most often this
is done by exporting the nodes and their relationships into either JSON objects or the
object format required of the visualization being used. D3.js has a huge plethora of
options when it comes to potential visualizations and sifting through them for
visualizations that match a particular use case is required. A few different visualizations
will be introduced along with their use cases. The first example from the D3.js website is
a packed circle graph which can be seen below:
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Figure 9. Example packed circle graph for graph data visualization (Bostock, 2019).
The above visualization is an excellent way to condense data into smaller
subsections that can be traversed interactively in a web browser. It addresses one of
the main problems with the other presented visualizations by containing the data set to
an easy to digest set of subsections. The downside is each of these subsections needs
to be designed and created to match specific use cases that users of the visualization
may desire. As such if a packed circle graph was to be designed to contain a list of
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CVE’s and their subsequent operating systems and domains it would need to be
outlined and designed to meet the requirements of the users.
The next visualization is the radial tidy tree and can be seen below:

Figure 10. Example radial tidy tree for graph data visualization (Sontrop, 2018).
The radial tree is a bit more explicit in its labeling and helps paint a better picture
of what object parents have what object children. As such it is a great way to visualize a
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simple understandable network hierarchy to show what is owned under a specific
domain. Again, it would need to be configured to meet the user’s requirements.
Up next is a collapsible force layout, this is a layout similar to the one built into
Neo4j but has the benefit of being more modifiable than the one present within Neo4j. It
can be seen in Figure 11 below:

Figure 11. Example collapsible force layout for graph data visualization (Bostock, 2019).
The advantages of the D3.js graphs is their being modifiable by a developer to
better fit an end users’ needs along with the ease of putting them into a web browser for
ease of access.
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Vis.js. This visualization framework offers customization options for a multitude
of different visualization style sets. These stylizations are fairly straightforward and do
well for showing simple data sets visually. The following are examples from the
framework:

Figure 12. Simple Vis.js graph relationship visualization option (Visjs, 2019).
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Figure 13. Complex Vis.js graph relationship visualization option (Visjs, 2019).
The above figures from the Vis.js website offer some simple as well as in-depth
solutions for visualization that differ slightly from the other options mentioned previously.
The first example in Figure 12 introduces an easy to understand framework that uses
pictures instead of simple circles for nodes. For computers and network graphs, this
provides a simple picture of the network that is easy to understand and interpret. A large
amount of complexity is lost due to the nature of the graph but the benefits gained are
the ease of digesting the graph at a glance for experts as well as lay persons. Figure 13
works similarly to the one presented in Figure 7 but has more options for nodes and
edge customization. Such as the curvature present on the edges in the visualization as
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well as the node color and size. Vis.js has a multitude of other visualization options
available that can be perused to find one that fits well for a particular use case.
Sigma.js. The basic description from Neo4j is as follows: “Sigma is a highlyextensible library meant for modification to meet the requirements necessary of it. It
takes JSON and GEXF formats as inputs and is highly modifiable to meet varying
requirements.“ (Neo4j, 2018) The example from the Sigma website does an excellent
job showcasing its ability to be modified as it shows a walk through with more and more
extensibility added at each step. Starting with the basic graph import, a hover text
feature is added to show the node name on hovering the node. Next an on click function
that trims the node to highlight only its relevant relations is added. The two can be seen
in the screenshots from the Sigma site below:

Figure 14. Full Sigma.js library example (Jacomy, 2019).
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Figure 15. Drill down enhancement for Sigma.js library example (Jacomy, 2019).
In Figure 14 the on hover functionality can be seen and in Figure 15 the on click
functionality to limit nodes to only directly related ones can be seen. Both of these
functionalities can be useful from a data exploration perspective to increase the
effectiveness of the visualization and assist in helping specialists asks the right
questions during a zero-day vulnerability announcement and remediation.
Vivagraph.js. Offers a few interesting customizations options built into it that are
similar to the other offerings but has something new to offer as well. Similar to Vis.js,
Vivagraph can use alternate images to represent nodes instead of just simple circles; in
the case of Vivagraph, it can use custom images with little configuration which is a great
feature to have. Along with that feature, Vivagraph has one more feature that sets it
apart from the others and that is its layout customization options. For example, in the
below screenshots from their GitHub that feature can be seen in action:
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Figure 16. No layout applied Vivagraph example (Anvaka, 2019).

Figure 17. Layout applied Vivagraph example (Anvaka, 2019).
The two node sets in Figure 16 and 17 above are the same set of nodes just
without a layout applied to them. Vivagraph gives the ability to apply and customize a
layout to the set of nodes and create a cleaned up layout like the one in Figure fifteen.
This is particularly helpful in CSIR due to the nature of computers generally being in
groups and clusters. Sets of servers, sets of user computers, sets of mobile devices and
so forth. Being able to customize the organization of those node sets allows for the
resulting visualization to be more understandable at a glance.
Cytoscape.js. This visualization framework offers another differentiating feature
that separates it from the others in having touch screen compatibility. Outside of
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touchscreen capability, it has similar offerings to the previous frameworks. As such its
main usage niche is if particular requirements pertaining to touch screen compatibility
are required.
Standalone product tools. Along with the frameworks presented above, there
are standalone products that can be purchased that provide visualization options and
custom implementations. The brief introduction for these tools is as follows:
“Certain tools and products are designed as standalone applications that can
connect to Neo4j and interact with the stored data without involving any code.
These applications are built with non-developers in mind–for business analysts,
data scientists, managers, and other users to interact with Neo4j in a node-graph
format.“ (Neo4J, 2018)
GraphXR. Touted as a “start-to-finish web-based visualization platform for
interactive analytics” (Neo4J, 2018). GraphXR offers data collection and presentation
through built-in Neo4J Desktop connections. Their range of applications includes law
enforcement, medical research, and knowledge management. An example of one
implementation of the GraphXR suite can be seen below:
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Figure 18. Example GraphXR implementation (Neo4J, 2018).
yFiles. This suite offers a wide range of potential visualization options and
integration with Neo4J Desktop. The yFiles website site introduces yFiles with the
following:
“Turn your data into clear diagrams with the help of unequaled automatic
diagram layouts, use rich visualizations for your diagram elements, and give your
users an intuitive interface for smooth interaction. With yFiles diagramming
components you will get this out-of-the-box for your applications. On nearly any
platform or technology.“ (yFiles, 2019)
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Their suite of visualizations is amalgamated in the below screenshot:

Figure 19. yFiles Visalization options aggregation (Neo4J, 2018).
Linkurious Enterprise. Designed for use in assisting analysts with detecting and
analyzing threats in large pools of connected data. Linkurious is used to fight “financial
crime, terror networks or cyber threats.” (Neo4J, 2018) In an example from their site on
detecting credit card fraud with Neo4J some sample visualization can be seen below:
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Figure 20. Small-scale Linkurio graph model for detecting credit card fraud (Linkurio,
2018).

Figure 21. Medium-scale Linkurio graph model for detecting credit card fraud
(Linkurio, 2018).
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Graphistry. This suite abstracts queries and wrangling with data away from the
user and automatically handles transforming the data into visual investigation maps built
for the needs of analysts. An example of visualization can be seen below:

Figure 22. Visual investigation map using graphistry (Neo4J, 2018)
Perspectives. This solution offers a wide range of options for data visualization
with a graph database browser option, a network topology option, and more. Below the
network topology visualization is shown:
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Figure 23. Tom Sawyer perspectives network visualization option (Tom Sawyer, 2019).
Keylines. This suite offers a variety of options for visualization much like the
other frameworks, the key difference is Keylines touts the ability to work on any device
and on any common browser. A Keylines visualization sample can be seen below:

Figure 24. Keylines network and business organization visualzation examples (Keylines,
2019).
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With the various options for visualization of Neo4J data covered it is possible to
move forward into the literature review.
Literature Related to the Problem
There is a plethora of information relating to graph databases as can be seen in
the studies by Angles (2012) and Buerli (2012). These two studies looked at different
aspects of graph databases and their differences. Buerli did a more generalized
overview of different graph databases and their technical differences. Angles focused
more on documenting the feature set, operations, and data structures that were
leveraged by each graph database solution. Along with these general overviews, there
are also many optimization problems that need to be solved with graph databases, such
as querying subgraphs of large sets of data (Hong, Zou, Lian, & Yu, 2015) for the
varying design architectures shown in the write-up by Buerli. The subgraph querying
process is highlighted well in a paper by Venkatesh (2014). These aforementioned
papers help define most of the necessary background as far as graph databases are
concerned. Covering the relevant problems as well as introducing concepts that differ
from relational databases.
The history of graph databases naturally starts with the history of databases. This
history is reviewed in a paper by Berg, Seymour, and Goel where they detail databases
throughout the decades starting with 1960s up through the early 21 st century. The
1960s mark a period in time where it became more cost effective for companies to
increase the sizes of their data stores. The two models used were the network model
CODASYL (Conference on Data System Language) and the hierarchical model IMS
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(Information Management System). A summary of that first generation from the Berg et
al. paper is as follows:
“The first generation of database systems was navigational. Applications typically
accessed data by following pointers from one record to another. Storage details
depended on the type of data to be stored. Thus, adding an extra field to
database required rewriting the underlying access/modification scheme.
Emphasis was on records to be processed, not overall structure of the system. A
user would need to know the physical structure of the database in order to query
for information. One database that proved to be a commercial success was the
SABRE system that was used by IBM to help American Airlines manage its
reservations data (Bercich, 2002). This system is still utilized by the major travel
services for their reservation systems.” (Berg et al., 2012)
The 1970s brought further improvements, changes, and new designs to the
database environment. The biggest of those being the creation of the relational
database model. The relational model suggested that applications search for content
rather than by using links. The key of this model was having the local organization
disconnected from the physical information storage leading up to this becoming the
standard for database systems. Two major relational databases were created at this
time INGRES and System R. Each lead to a multitude of offshoots that are well known
today such as MS SQL, POSTGRES, Oracle, DB2, and more. Around this time the
Entity-Relationship model was proposed and allowed for designers to focus on
applications of data rather than the logical table structure.
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During the 1980s commercialization of these systems from the 1970s began to
rapidly proliferate and some from the 1960s began to fall out of use. Some such
systems that began to fall out of use were network and hierarchical models which are
used in some legacy systems but sparsely used outside that. During this period the
creation of the object-oriented database system occurred. These databases are
designed for integration with various programming languages with the main feature
being the support of modeling and creation of data as objects. The main benefits and
drawbacks being highlighted in the following from Berg et al.,
“OODBMS could efficiently manage a large number of different data types.
Objects with complex behaviors were easy to handle using inheritance and
polymorphism. This also helped in reducing the large number of relations by
creating objects. The biggest problem with OODBMS was switching an existing
database to OODBMS, as the transition requires an entire change from scratch
and it is typically tied to a specific programming language and an API
(Application Programming Interface) which reduces the flexibility of the database.
To overcome the problems of OODBMS and take full advantage of the relational
model and object-oriented model, the Object Relational Database Model was
developed in the early 1990s.” (Berg et al., 2012)
The 1990s resulted in the death of a fair amount of database providers and
resulted in the remaining companies to offer more complex products at higher prices.
Most developments focused on client tools for building applications. Toward the end of
the 1990s, Extensible Markup Language (XML) was introduced which helped solve
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long-standing database problems. During this time period, NoSQL was also introduced
by Carlo Strozzi. These NoSQL datastores are described and introduced in the
following quote from Berg et al:
“Often, NoSQL databases are categorized according to the way they store the
data and they fall under categories such as key-value stores, BigTable
implementations, document store databases, and graph databases. NoSQL
database systems rose alongside major internet companies, such as Google,
Amazon, Twitter, and Facebook, which had significantly different challenges in
dealing with data that the traditional RDBMS solutions could not cope. NoSQL
databases are often highly optimized for retrieve and append operations and
often offer little functionality beyond record storage. The reduced run time
flexibility, compared to full SQL systems, is compensated by significant gains in
scalability and performance for certain data models.” (Berg et al., 2012)
The above section from Berg et al. introduces NoSQL and as such the basic
infrastructure needed for graph databases. NoSQL has many applications outside of
graphs, though for the purpose of this literature review the graph database applications
of NoSQL and its history will be the focus of the next section.
Graph databases originated from graph theory, graph theory and the basic idea
of graphs were introduced by the Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler in the 18 th
century to solve the Königsberg bridge problem. The problem is outlined and briefly
detailed in a paper by Victor Adamchik (2005) below:
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Figure 25. Visual representation of Königsberg bridge problem (Adamchik, 2005).
“German city of Königsberg (now it is Russian Kaliningrad) was situated on the
river Pre-gel. It had a park situated on the banks of the river and two islands.
Mainland and islands were joined by seven bridges. A problem was whether it
was possible to take a walk through the town in such a way as to cross over
every bridge once, and only once.” (Adamchik, 2005)
The graph of the problem is below:

Figure 26. Graph representation of Königsberg bridge problem (Adamchik, 2005).
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The subsequent graph makes solving the Königsberg bridge problem much
easier to manage. There are a few other problems addressed by graph theory such as
the traveling salesman problem and the four coloring problem that can be addressed
with graphs. Graph theory is the basis for graph databases and using them to solve
problems that occur within graphs. Graph databases themselves are based on Graph
theory and NoSQL to solve problems present in classical database schema which often
fail to scale horizontally and instead can only scale vertically. Silvan Weber expands on
some of the various NoSQL databases defined in Berg et al. giving examples for each.
The brief description of graphing databases is as follows:
“Nowadays, for example, graph databases can be used in location-based
services (LBS), to find common friends on social networks or to establish the
shortest paths through the daily traffic (with standard algorithms like Dijkstra) or,
in a more general manner, for the efficient querying of data in a network.“
(Weber)
With graph theory and graph databases introduced and the background given in
the previous section, a road map can be seen for how the current marketplace of graph
databases has come to be.
Zero-day vulnerabilities are covered in a few pieces of literature with the best
coverage by Bilge and Dumitras (2012). Their paper gives a great summary of the zeroday problem with the following quote:
“A zero-day attack is a cyber attack exploiting a vulnerability that has not been
disclosed publicly. There is almost no defense against a zero-day attack: while
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the vulnerability remains unknown, the software affected cannot be patched and
anti-virus products cannot detect the attack through signature-based scanning.”
When a zero-day is discovered and publicly disclosed there is often a huge spike
in malware and other attacks that leverage that zero-day vulnerability as can be seen
from Bilge’s et al. (2012) work and the following results in respect to malware and other
exploits leveraging publicly disclosed zero-day vulnerabilities: “183–85,000 more
variants are detected each day” after public disclosure. The massive uptick in the usage
of the exploit creates a situation where rapid infection of unpatched systems can occur
as can be seen in the Petya (S. 2017), WannaCry (2017), Meltdown (Lipp, Schwarz,
Gross, Prescher, Haas, Fogh, & Hamburg, 2019) and Spectre (Lipp et al., 2019)
vulnerabilities. In many cases, due to the nature of zero-day vulnerabilities, it is also
necessary to patch existing systems that were already infected with a zero-day
vulnerability that had not yet been exposed. Once a now disclosed zero-day is
discovered within the network, determining the blast radius is of the utmost importance
to the removal of the exploit and re-securing the system.
Literature related directly to the problem specifically is rather sparse due to
expertise in both security incident response being needed along with an understanding
of graph databases. The one paper that directly addresses parts of those problems in
depth is the paper by Noel et al. (2014). In this paper, they create a framework for using
graph databases to discover obvious and less obvious security vulnerabilities that might
be possible within a system for the purposes of threat and vulnerability management
and remediation. In the case of the paper, Noel et al. (2014) use their framework as a
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detection and prevention platform for finding and remediating potentially missed exploit
chains.
Summary
This section introduced graph databases, why Neo4j was a good choice and
used in Noel et al. (2014), introduced the framework set up by Noel et al. (2014), and
set up the groundwork for the methodology to be used to address finding the blast
radius of newly disclosed zero-days leveraging the framework presented in Noel et al.
(2014). Background information was given on a specific sub-problem relating to data
visualization in larger data sets as well as potential frameworks that can be used to
address visualization problems that may present themselves within those data sets.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
In this chapter, there will be an exposition into the design of an environment to
test finding the blast radius of a newly released zero-day vulnerability using the
framework presented by Noel et al. (2014). Three tests with various numbers of
vulnerable servers will be performed. As the network grows so will the network
requirements and structures needed to support it. Though the architecture grows and
exceeds a depth of four in certain situations it will not come close to the size of a
massive enterprise network. As such there are considerations that must be made with
visualization and the data set in general moving forward.
Design of the Study
A qualitative approach will be used during this study as the goal is to unearth a
methodology that can be used to dynamically enumerate the blast radius of a zero-day
attack. The difficulty becomes apparent due to the nature of zero-day attacks leveraging
potentially unknown attack vectors. If the graph database used for detecting the attack
has no way to create a subgraph of the potentially affected machines due to a lack of
data it will be impossible to create a depiction of the blast radius for that particular zeroday vulnerability. The larger the pool of ancillary data the easier it is to create an
accurate subgraph and subsequent map of the blast radius for a given zero-day. The
key here being that enough ancillary data must be included to detect the majority of
zero-day attacks so that it is possible to create subgraphs and subsequently a blast
radius of the zero-day event.
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The nature of zero-day vulnerabilities, however, do not lend themselves to a
situation where they are completely detectable as there will be cases where a database
will be missing information necessary to create a subgraph that can be fitted to find the
blast radius of a zero-day. Due to this taking stock of data that is needed to detect a
specific zero-day can help in the discovery of new zero-days that leverage different but
similar vulnerabilities. As such looking at the infection vectors of specific zero-days is a
good start for creating a methodology for detecting newly discovered zero-day
vulnerabilities.
The set of tests is designed to be done over an iterative scale for a general proof
of concept. On a small-scale up through a large-scale where more complex networking
architecture and hosts are added as the tests progress. The first set of tests leverages a
small-scale data center and works as a proof of concept on a small-scale. The second
set of tests adds a few more variables to better simulate a real-world network and zeroday scenario. The third test adds more clones of the data center to act as a
representation of multiple data centers that a larger organization would have and tests
detection across multiple differing disconnected domains.
Data Collection–Small-scale
The first test requires working with small data set to create subgraphs for a
specific zero-day. In this case, a sample small data center graph is built in Neo4j using
one of the GraphGist modules created by Bastani (2019). In that article the following
hand created architecture diagram can be seen:
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Figure 27. GraphGist small data center diagram (Bastani, 2019).
After being imported into Neo4j using the queries provided in the GraphGist the
following graph which mirrors the above diagram becomes apparent:
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Figure 28. Diagram represented within graphing database Neo4J
Using this small-scale data center, it is possible to see the various hardware and
software and its individual dependencies. The next step in this small-scale test is to
introduce a zero-day vulnerability node and exploit node similar to the framework
provided by Noel et al. (2014). In this initial test, the goal is to show it is possible to
detect a released or discovered zero-day given the data to do so exists within our
graph. The test zero-day for this case is the Apache Struts vulnerability present in
Apache Struts versions 2.2.0 and lower. The two web servers present in the small-scale
data center have been modified to have the following attribute to represent having their
versioning properly documented within the Neo4j database.
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// Create Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.5',
host:'WEBSERVER-1',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0” })
In bold above the node is tagged with a version documenting it leveraging
Apache Struts 2.2.0 and subsequently being vulnerable to the Apache Struts
vulnerability being tested for. Next, the vulnerability test case is added:
CREATE (vuln1:Vulnerability {
name: "Vuln 1.1",
CVE_number: "CVE-2010-1870",
description: "Apache Struts Remote Command Execution",
port_requirements: "80",
software_requirements:"Apache Struts <2.2.0"
})
The above code snippet documents a basic vulnerability node identical in
concept to the ones presented in Noel et al. With that node created and added to the
graph it is possible to move onto the next section. Next, it is necessary to make a
subgraph of the entire graph leveraging the struts vulnerability defined above to the
nodes vulnerable to them:
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MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.CVE_number="CVE-2010-1870" AND
m.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" CREATE (n)-[:ON]→(m)
Using the statement above variables n and m are gathered into a list of nodes
that correspond to their particular information set within the query. Ergo in the case of n,
nodes that correspond to the tag CVE_number and match the value “CVE-2010-1870”
will be gathered and stored within n. The same will occur for m with version and
“Apache Struts 2.2.0”. From that point, a relationship is added between the gather n and
m nodes in this case defined as “ON”. Thus, the written-out query tells us to add a
relationship to show the vulnerability node exists on web server nodes matching the
requirements defined in the query. From there an exploit node is added based on the
newly created zero-day:
CREATE (exploit1:Exploit {
name: "Exploit 1",
description: "Apache Struts Remote Command Execution",
software_requirements:"Apache Struts <2.2.0" })
With this now created the public facing websites that can be used to exploit the
Apache Struts vulnerability can be connected to the exploit node, and subsequently the
exploit node can be connected to the vulnerable web server.
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.system="INTERNET" AND m.name="Exploit 1"
CREATE (n)-[:EXPLOITS]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name="Exploit 1" AND m.version="Apache
Struts 2.2.0" CREATE (n)-[:VICTIM]→(m)
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Below is the current graph with its new exploit connections:

Figure 28.1. Graph after adding vulnerability node to affected machines.
Doing a selection from this graph for the relevant sections results in the following
where the public facing internet websites can exploit the struts vulnerability on the web
server hosting it.
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Figure 28.2. Subgraph showing only machines vulnerable to Apache struts.
The small-scale test shows that the graph database was able to dynamically add
hosted websites and connect it to the potentially vulnerable web server. This section
showed how to implement the framework presented by Noel et al. to identify the
potentially exploitable nodes. A few more nodes and network devices will be added
when moving up to a larger system, causing the relations to become more complicated.
Each subsequent test increases the number of node traversals required to find the
affected nodes.
Data Collection–Medium Scale
Taking the previous data center and modifying it to contain multiple data centers
with various connections requires the addition of a few networking structures such as
firewalls and the connections between those various firewalls and data centers. In the
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following figure two switches have been added as well as an internal firewall between
the switches acting as a routing device:

Figure 29. Medium-scale datacenter represented within Neo4J.
The newly added data center is a mirror of the previous nodes with the switch
and firewall nodes added with the code snippet below:
CREATE (switch1:Switch {
name: "Switch 1",
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type: "PHYSICAL SWITCH",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})
CREATE (switch2_1:Switch {
name: "Switch 2",
type: "PHYSICAL SWITCH",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})
CREATE (firewall1:Firewall {
name: "Internal Firewall 1",
type: "FIREWALL",
system: "PHYSICAL FIREWALL"
})
The above snippets are fairly straight forward and create nodes with a name,
type, and system value. The following section creates relationships between those
various nodes:
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 1" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-1" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 1" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 1" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-3" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
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The above block of code assigns relationships between hardware servers and
their corresponding switch, the same is done for the second switch. The below snippet
creates the relationship between the internal firewall and the newly added switches.
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Internal Firewall 1" AND m.name = "Switch
1" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Internal Firewall 1" AND m.name = "Switch
2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]→(m)
Both newly added topologies are the same as the first structurally just using
different node names. The exploit node and its relationships are re-added using the
same query from the small-scale example. The vulnerability node is omitted since each
node is tagged with vulnerability data directly so it is unneeded for this data set.
Running the query from earlier shows a similar output from before but with the new web
servers and the respective exploits ↔ victim relationship:
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Figure 29.1. Subgraph showing medium-scale machines vulnerable to Apache struts.
Data Collection–Large-scale
In the large-scale test, an additional data center was added connected to another
switch and internal firewall. In this way, the separate graphs can be seen to be on a
separate domain, though they can also be linked through a DMZ or internet node and
queried separately from there as well depending on the architecture being mapped
within the graph database. The new graph can be seen below:
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Figure 30. Large-scale datacenter with split domains.
Again the exploit node and its subsequent connections are created resulting in
the following graph:
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Figure 30.1. Subgraph showing large-scale machines vulnerable to Apache struts.
In a situation like above, the search is not domain agnostic and in some cases
that could prove problematic. If only one domain is suspected of being infected there
would be a large number of false positives created by querying the entire dataset. The
query can be modified to the following to query a subgraph of a subgraph to return
domain-specific results:
MATCH (switchvar:Switch { name: "Switch 3" })←[:DEPENDS_ON| ROUTES]>(vulnmachine:Hardware)
WITH vulnmachine
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MATCH (vulnmachine)←[:DEPENDS_ON]-(webserver)←[VICTIM|EXPLOITS]>(exploiter)
WHERE webserver.version = "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
RETURN *

Figure 30.2. Subgraph showing machines on network Switch 3 vulnerable to Apache
struts.
The above results show the vulnerable web servers and hardware on the new
domain under the newly added “Switch 3”. The same can be done for the other switches
and results in similar graphs displaying the correct vulnerable web servers on their
respective domains.
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Figure 30.3. Subgraphs showing machines on network Switch 2 & 1 vulnerable to
Apache struts.
First is “Switch 2” and its vulnerable hardware, second is “Switch 1” and its
vulnerable hardware. All of these queries completed in less than one second even
though the needed number of traversals to find the nodes exceeds four.
Summary
In this section, small, medium, and large-scale tests were performed to test on
the fly additions of exploit nodes and the ability to create an accurate blast radius
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summary from that data. Along with that diving into a specific section of a subgraph of a
subgraph was done in order to show graph databases ability to address the network
problem and still return a blast radius for a specific network segment.
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Chapter 4: Data Presentation and Analysis
Introduction
In this chapter, there will be an analysis of the small, medium, and large-scale
tests and their results. With each set of results, the expected outputs versus the actual
outputs will be compared.
Data Presentation–Small-scale
In this first experiment, the basic framework format by Noel et al. (2014) was
implemented into a test data center architecture. The data center was modified to
contain information about machines that could be used to find the Apache Struts
vulnerability within the graph. This first set of tests was designed to show a basic proof
of concept for how a potential zero-day vulnerability could be correlated and found by
taking a subgraph of the existing graph. In this test set, there were only two vulnerable
web servers and a total of five external websites capable of exploiting those web
servers.
Table 3
Small-scale Expected vs Generated Results
Expected

Results

Web servers

2

2

Exploit sites

5

5

Data Presentation–Medium-scale
In this set of tests, more data centers were added to the existing one from the
small-scale test and some networking equipment was added between them. This set of
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tests shows that with more nodes and complexity added the graph is able to return the
affected nodes and the potential tangentially related attack nodes. The affected nodes
are returned and are related to their vulnerable web server directly in the resulting
subgraph. Returning the potentially vulnerable web sites tied to their requisite web
server allows for fast remediation and prioritization based on web portal size or
importance to the organization.
Table 4
Medium-scale Expected vs Generated Results
Expected

Results

Web servers

6

6

Exploit sites

15

15

Data Presentation–Large-scale
This set of tests again added more potentially vulnerable web servers and a
different domain that is disconnected from the main graph. In running this set of tests,
the same test query was used to generate the following results:
Table 5
Large-scale Expected vs Generated Results
Expected

Results

Web servers

10

10

Exploit sites

25

25
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As can be seen in the subgraph having a disconnected graph had no bearing on
the results due to the nature of implementing the exploit nodes relationships based on
data tagged to the existing nodes. This section’s data collection also showcased the
ability to take a subgraph of a subgraph in order to gather the affected web server
nodes from the new domain added for the large-scale tests.
Data Analysis
The data collected works as a proof of concept to show that on various scales
with differing levels of network complexity it is possible to add and detect zero-day
attacks given the attack vector and version of software or hardware being exploited
exists within the graph database. This is shown with the results given in the small,
medium, and large-scale tests leveraging the framework provided in Noel et al. (2014).
Along with being able to add exploit nodes on the fly using the framework presented by
Noel et al. (2014) it points towards a possible method to explore zero-day exploits that
may proliferate across domains should a zero-day leverage multiple different attack
vectors.
Summary
In this chapter, the expected results were compared with the results gathered
from querying the graph database. Manually doing an analysis of the graph nodes
showed that it correlated correctly with the results procedurally generated based on
node data. Along with that analysis showing the potential usage of querying a subgraph
of a subgraph as a possibility for narrowing the search scope assists in performing
reconnaissance on specific sections of the network.
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Chapter 5: Results, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
In this section, the importance and implications of the gathered data are explored
and analyzed. The tests are first analyzed for their success as a proof of concept; next,
the potential exceptions are outlined and detailed. Moreover, the potential for use of the
framework presented by Noel et al. (2014) being leveraged for more than just threat and
vulnerability management. Second, problems potentially present when visualizing data
with Neo4j’s built-in tools is elucidated and outlined for potential use in future works.
Results
The key question posed in the methodology is if it is possible to use a graph
database to detect and address zero-day vulnerabilities given data exists to identify
potentially at-risk systems within the graph database. The results show that in the case
of the Apache Struts vulnerability which was used as the test case it is possible to
detect vulnerable websites and web servers given the criterion mentioned earlier is met.
This may not hold true in all cases however as certain zero-day vulnerabilities may
leverage unknown attack vectors that cannot easily be stored within a graph database
ahead of time. One example of this would be something such as Van Eck Phreaking
that involves measuring side-band electromagnetic emissions. Vulnerability to such an
attack vector would generally not be logged anywhere and would be difficult if not
impossible to quickly create a query for so that an exploit node and relationships could
be created. In other cases, however, such as Petya or Spectre, where a hardware
vulnerability or a particular version of the software is exploited, the vulnerable machines
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can be identified fairly easily based on existing versioning or hardware information. As
such exploit nodes can be created dynamically and the resulting blast radius can be
determined. This holds true even in the face of the network problem due to the nature of
graph databases and their usage of index-free adjacency. In the case of Petya, it is
possible to go a step further as its infection vector is known along with its intended
victim. If the nodes within the graph contain information on the infection vector, in the
case of Petya it’s the allowance of the SMB protocol between machines, as well as the
operating system of the machine that’s vulnerable in this case windows. Then it is
possible to use the cross-domain vulnerability chains presented by Noel et al. (2014) to
find potential cross domain exploits using the method for dynamically generating exploit
nodes presented in this paper.
Moving forward to visualizations, Neo4j has a built-in visualization tool that
makes understanding basic graphs or subsections of a graph easy. A problem arises
when the need to visualize large pools of nodes arises. Neo4j can customize the
number of displayed nodes in each section or subsection of the graph to accommodate
this problem; however, it does not always result in being the best fit for visualizing that
particular data set. The best visualization framework for a particular situation is
requirements dependent and as such relies on stakeholder or situations needs. As such
the basic visualization provided by Neo4J was sufficient for the visualization needs of
this paper and as such was used to display the various results.
The focus of this paper was on the creation of exploit nodes on the fly to detect
zero-day vulnerabilities and not analyzing best-fit visualizations for that data set. As
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such the groundwork has been laid for future work relating to visualization methods for
security data and finding the pros and cons of the various methods of visualizing that
data.
Conclusion
The goal of this study was to provide a proof of concept for determining the blast
radius of a newly published zero-day vulnerability given the data to determine what
software or hardware is potentially at risk is known and contained within the graph
database. In the test cases presented the tested zero-day vulnerability was properly
detected and displayed the correct relationships when queried. In these test cases, it
was a simple relation that website --exploits→ web server, in other cases this
relationship may extend farther due to other vulnerabilities existing on the system. This
can also be detected using the framework presented by Noel et al. (2014) after the new
zero-day vulnerability exploit nodes are added. Along with the proof of concept querying
subgraphs of subgraphs was also covered to show the power of graph databases in
addressing the network problem to generate a more specific blast radius for specific
sections of the network.
Future Work
Studying different zero-day vulnerabilities and the infection vectors leveraged by
those vulnerabilities can assist in building upon the framework presented by Noel et al.
(2014) as well as show potential holes present in the overall graph’s construction that
could show where there might be missing information needed to detect outlier zero-day
vulnerabilities. As an example, information pertaining to SMB access across domains
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would need to be documented to detect the Petya vulnerability. Furthermore, study into
zero-day vulnerabilities that leverage multiple vectors of attack such as the first example
in Figure 4 of Noel et al. (2014) and how to exploit nodes for them can be added and
correctly linked would help protect against more advanced persistent threats more likely
to leverage something beyond simple malware.
Future work pertaining to various visualization methods and the benefits as well
as weaknesses of those methods is an open area of research. Using the resources
provided by Neo4j in their developer section various integrations with graphing solutions
are outlined and explored. Taking these solutions and performing an analysis on their
uses when integrated with security data as presented in this paper to find the strengths
and weaknesses of a multitude of different visualization methods is an open area that
requires more research.
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Appendix
// Create CRM
CREATE (crm1:Application {
ip:'10.10.32.1',
host:'CRM-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'CRM'
})

// Create ERP
CREATE (erp1:Application {
ip:'10.10.33.1',
host:'ERP-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'ERP'
})

// Create Data Warehouse
CREATE (datawarehouse1:Application {
ip:'10.10.34.1',
host:'DATA-WAREHOUSE',
type: 'DATABASE',
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system: 'DW'
})

// Create Public Website 1
CREATE (Internet1:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'global.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 2
CREATE (Internet2:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'support.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 3
CREATE (Internet3:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
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host:'shop.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 4
CREATE (Internet4:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'training.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 5
CREATE (Internet5:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'partners.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Internal Website 1
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CREATE (Intranet1:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'events.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 2
CREATE (Intranet2:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'intranet.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 3
CREATE (Intranet3:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'humanresources.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})
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// Create Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.5',
host:'WEBSERVER-1',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.6',
host:'WEBSERVER-2',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Database VM 1
CREATE (customerdatabase1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.7',
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host:'CUSTOMER-DB-1',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 2
CREATE (customerdatabase2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.8',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-2',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 3
CREATE (databasevm3:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.9',
host:'ERP-DB',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 4
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CREATE (dwdatabase:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.10',
host:'DW-DATABASE',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Hardware 1
CREATE (hardware1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.11',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-1',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware2:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.12',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-2',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})
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// Create Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware3:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.13',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-3',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create SAN 1
CREATE (san1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.14',
host:'SAN',
type: "STORAGE AREA NETWORK",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Connect CRM to Database VM 1
CREATE (crm1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Database VM 1
CREATE (Internet1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase1),
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(Internet2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase1),
(Internet3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase1)

// Connect Database VM 1 to Hardware 1
CREATE (customerdatabase1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware1)

// Connect Hardware 1 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet1),
(webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet2),
(webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet3)

// Connect Internal Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet1),
(webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet2),
(webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet3)

// Connect Webserver VM 1 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware2)
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// Connect Hardware 2 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san1)

// Connect Webserver VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-6 to Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet4),
(webservervm2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet5)

// Connect Database VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(customerdatabase2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-5 to Database VM 2
CREATE (Internet4)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2),
(Internet5)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2)

// Connect Hardware 3 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san1)

// Connect Database VM 3 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(databasevm3)
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// Connect ERP 1 to Database VM 3
CREATE (erp1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(databasevm3)

// Connect Database VM 4 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(dwdatabase)

// Connect Data Warehouse 1 to Database VM 4
CREATE (datawarehouse1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(dwdatabase)

RETURN *

CREATE (vuln1:Vulnerability {
name: "Vuln 1.1",
CVE_number: "CVE-2010-1870",
description: "Apache Struts Remote Command Execution",
port_requirements: "80",
software_requirements:"Apache Struts <2.2.0"
})

//MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" AND
m.CVE_number="CVE-2010-1870" CREATE (n)-[:ON]->(m)
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MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.CVE_number="CVE-2010-1870" AND
m.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" CREATE (n)-[:ON]->(m)

CREATE (exploit1:Exploit {
name: "Exploit 1",
description: "Apache Struts Remote Command Execution",
software_requirements:"Apache Struts <2.2.0"
})

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.system="INTERNET" AND m.name="Exploit 1" CREATE
(n)-[:EXPLOITS]->(m)

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name="Exploit 1" AND m.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0"
CREATE (n)-[:VICTIM]->(m)

MATCH (n) WHERE n.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" AND n.name="Exploit 1" AND
n.system="INTERNET" RETURN n

MATCH (exploit1:Exploit { name: "Exploit 1" })<-[:VICTIM|EXPLOITS]>(vulnmachine) RETURN *

//--------------------------------------------------
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CREATE (switch1:Switch {
name: "Switch 1",
type: "PHYSICAL SWITCH",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

CREATE (switch2_1:Switch {
name: "Switch 2",
type: "PHYSICAL SWITCH",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

CREATE (firewall1:Firewall {
name: "Internal Firewall 1",
type: "FIREWALL",
system: "PHYSICAL FIREWALL"
})
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MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 1" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-1" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 1" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 1" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-3" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.type = "PHYSICAL SWITCH" AND m.host =
"HARDWARE-SERVER-2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.type = "PHYSICAL SWITCH" AND m.host =
"HARDWARE-SERVER-3" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Internal Firewall 1" AND m.name = "Switch 1"
CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Internal Firewall 1" AND m.name = "Switch 2"
CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

CREATE (vuln1:Vulnerability {
name: "Vuln 1.1",
CVE_number: "CVE-2010-1870",
description: "Apache Struts Remote Command Execution",
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port_requirements: "80",
software_requirements:"Apache Struts <2.2.0"
})

MATCH (n) where id(n) = 44 DETACH DELETE n

-----------------------------MEDIUM

// Create CRM
CREATE (crm1:Application {
ip:'10.10.32.1',
host:'CRM-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'CRM'
})

// Create ERP
CREATE (erp1:Application {
ip:'10.10.33.1',
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host:'ERP-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'ERP'
})

// Create Data Warehouse
CREATE (datawarehouse1:Application {
ip:'10.10.34.1',
host:'DATA-WAREHOUSE',
type: 'DATABASE',
system: 'DW'
})

// Create Public Website 1
CREATE (Internet1:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'global.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 2
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CREATE (Internet2:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'support.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 3
CREATE (Internet3:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'shop.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 4
CREATE (Internet4:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'training.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})
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// Create Public Website 5
CREATE (Internet5:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'partners.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Internal Website 1
CREATE (Intranet1:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'events.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 2
CREATE (Intranet2:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'intranet.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
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system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 3
CREATE (Intranet3:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'humanresources.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.5',
host:'WEBSERVER-1',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm2:VirtualMachine {
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ip:'10.10.35.6',
host:'WEBSERVER-2',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Database VM 1
CREATE (customerdatabase1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.7',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-1',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 2
CREATE (customerdatabase2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.8',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-2',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})
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// Create Database VM 3
CREATE (databasevm3:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.9',
host:'ERP-DB',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 4
CREATE (dwdatabase:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.10',
host:'DW-DATABASE',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Hardware 1
CREATE (hardware1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.11',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-1',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
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system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware2:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.12',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-2',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware3:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.13',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-3',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create SAN 1
CREATE (san1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.14',
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host:'SAN',
type: "STORAGE AREA NETWORK",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Connect CRM to Database VM 1
CREATE (crm1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Database VM 1
CREATE (Internet1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase1),
(Internet2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase1),
(Internet3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase1)

// Connect Database VM 1 to Hardware 1
CREATE (customerdatabase1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware1)

// Connect Hardware 1 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet1),
(webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet2),
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(webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet3)

// Connect Internal Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet1),
(webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet2),
(webservervm1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet3)

// Connect Webserver VM 1 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware2)

// Connect Hardware 2 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san1)

// Connect Webserver VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-6 to Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet4),
(webservervm2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet5)

// Connect Database VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(customerdatabase2)
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// Connect Public Websites 4-5 to Database VM 2
CREATE (Internet4)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2),
(Internet5)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2)

// Connect Hardware 3 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san1)

// Connect Database VM 3 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(databasevm3)

// Connect ERP 1 to Database VM 3
CREATE (erp1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(databasevm3)

// Connect Database VM 4 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(dwdatabase)

// Connect Data Warehouse 1 to Database VM 4
CREATE (datawarehouse1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(dwdatabase)

// Create CRM
CREATE (crm2_1:Application {
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ip:'10.10.32.1',
host:'CRM-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'CRM'
})

// Create ERP
CREATE (erp2_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.33.1',
host:'ERP-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'ERP'
})

// Create Data Warehouse
CREATE (datawarehouse2_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.34.1',
host:'DATA-WAREHOUSE',
type: 'DATABASE',
system: 'DW'
})
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// Create Public Website 1
CREATE (Internet2_1:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'global.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 2
CREATE (Internet2_2:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'support.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 3
CREATE (Internet2_3:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'shop.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
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})

// Create Public Website 4
CREATE (Internet2_4:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'training.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 5
CREATE (Internet2_5:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'partners.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Internal Website 1
CREATE (Intranet2_1:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'events.acme.net',
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type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 2
CREATE (Intranet2_2:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'intranet.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 3
CREATE (Intranet2_3:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'humanresources.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm2_1:VirtualMachine {
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ip:'10.10.35.5',
host:'WEBSERVER-1',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm2_2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.6',
host:'WEBSERVER-2',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Database VM 1
CREATE (customerdatabase2_1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.7',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-1',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
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})

// Create Database VM 2
CREATE (customerdatabase2_2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.8',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-2',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 3
CREATE (databasevm2_3:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.9',
host:'ERP-DB',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 4
CREATE (dwdatabase2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.10',
host:'DW-DATABASE',
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type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Hardware 1
CREATE (hardware2_1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.11',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-1',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware2_2:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.12',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-2',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware2_3:Hardware {
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ip:'10.10.35.13',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-3',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create SAN 1
CREATE (san2_1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.14',
host:'SAN',
type: "STORAGE AREA NETWORK",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Connect CRM to Database VM 1
CREATE (crm2_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2_1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Database VM 1
CREATE (Internet2_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2_1),
(Internet2_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2_1),
(Internet2_3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2_1)

115
// Connect Database VM 1 to Hardware 1
CREATE (customerdatabase2_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware2_1)

// Connect Hardware 1 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware2_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san2_1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm2_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet2_1),
(webservervm2_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet2_2),
(webservervm2_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet2_3)

// Connect Internal Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm2_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet2_1),
(webservervm2_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet2_2),
(webservervm2_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet2_3)

// Connect Webserver VM 1 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm2_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware2_2)

// Connect Hardware 2 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware2_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san2_1)
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// Connect Webserver VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm2_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware2_2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-6 to Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm2_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet2_4),
(webservervm2_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet2_5)

// Connect Database VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware2_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(customerdatabase2_2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-5 to Database VM 2
CREATE (Internet2_4)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2_2),
(Internet2_5)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase2_2)

// Connect Hardware 3 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware2_3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san2_1)

// Connect Database VM 3 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware2_3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(databasevm2_3)

// Connect ERP 1 to Database VM 3
CREATE (erp2_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(databasevm2_3)

117

// Connect Database VM 4 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware2_3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(dwdatabase2)

// Connect Data Warehouse 1 to Database VM 4
CREATE (datawarehouse2_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(dwdatabase2)

RETURN *
//RETURN *

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

// Create CRM
CREATE (crm3_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.32.1',
host:'CRM-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'CRM'
})

// Create ERP
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CREATE (erp3_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.33.1',
host:'ERP-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'ERP'
})

// Create Data Warehouse
CREATE (datawarehouse3_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.34.1',
host:'DATA-WAREHOUSE',
type: 'DATABASE',
system: 'DW'
})

// Create Public Website 1
CREATE (Internet3_1:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'global.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})
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// Create Public Website 2
CREATE (Internet3_2:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'support.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 3
CREATE (Internet3_3:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'shop.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 4
CREATE (Internet3_4:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'training.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
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system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 5
CREATE (Internet3_5:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'partners.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Internal Website 1
CREATE (Intranet3_1:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'events.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 2
CREATE (Intranet3_2:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
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host:'intranet.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 3
CREATE (Intranet3_3:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'humanresources.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm3_1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.5',
host:'WEBSERVER-1',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})
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// Create Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm3_2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.6',
host:'WEBSERVER-2',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Database VM 1
CREATE (customerdatabase3_1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.7',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-1',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 2
CREATE (customerdatabase3_2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.8',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-2',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
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system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 3
CREATE (databasevm3_3:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.9',
host:'ERP-DB',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 4
CREATE (dwdatabase3:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.10',
host:'DW-DATABASE',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Hardware 1
CREATE (hardware3_1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.11',
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host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-3_1',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware3_2:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.12',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-3_2',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware3_3:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.13',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-3_3',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create SAN 1
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CREATE (san3_1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.14',
host:'SAN',
type: "STORAGE AREA NETWORK",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Connect CRM to Database VM 1
CREATE (crm3_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase3_1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Database VM 1
CREATE (Internet3_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase3_1),
(Internet3_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase3_1),
(Internet3_3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase3_1)

// Connect Database VM 1 to Hardware 1
CREATE (customerdatabase3_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware3_1)

// Connect Hardware 1 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware3_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san3_1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1

126
CREATE (webservervm3_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet3_1),
(webservervm3_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet3_2),
(webservervm3_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet3_3)

// Connect Internal Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm3_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet3_1),
(webservervm3_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet3_2),
(webservervm3_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet3_3)

// Connect Webserver VM 1 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm3_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware3_2)

// Connect Hardware 2 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware3_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san3_1)

// Connect Webserver VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm3_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware3_2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-6 to Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm3_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet3_4),
(webservervm3_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet3_5)
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// Connect Database VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware3_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(customerdatabase3_2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-5 to Database VM 2
CREATE (Internet3_4)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase3_2),
(Internet3_5)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase3_2)

// Connect Hardware 3 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware3_3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san3_1)

// Connect Database VM 3 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware3_3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(databasevm3_3)

// Connect ERP 1 to Database VM 3
CREATE (erp3_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(databasevm3_3)

// Connect Database VM 4 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware3_3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(dwdatabase3)

// Connect Data Warehouse 1 to Database VM 4
CREATE (datawarehouse3_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(dwdatabase3)
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RETURN *

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 2" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-3_1" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 2" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-3_2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 2" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-3_3" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

CREATE (vuln1:Vulnerability {
name: "Vuln 1.1",
CVE_number: "CVE-2010-1870",
description: "Apache Struts Remote Command Execution",
port_requirements: "80",
software_requirements:"Apache Struts <2.2.0"
})
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//MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" AND
m.CVE_number="CVE-2010-1870" CREATE (n)-[:ON]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.CVE_number="CVE-2010-1870" AND
m.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" CREATE (n)-[:ON]->(m)

CREATE (exploit1:Exploit {
name: "Exploit 1",
description: "Apache Struts Remote Command Execution",
software_requirements:"Apache Struts <2.2.0"
})

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.system="INTERNET" AND m.name="Exploit 1" CREATE
(n)-[:EXPLOITS]->(m)

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name="Exploit 1" AND m.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0"
CREATE (n)-[:VICTIM]->(m)

MATCH (n) WHERE n.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" AND n.name="Exploit 1" AND
n.system="INTERNET" RETURN n

MATCH (exploit1:Exploit { name: "Exploit 1" })<-[:VICTIM|EXPLOITS]>(vulnmachine) RETURN *
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

// Create CRM
CREATE (crm4_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.32.1',
host:'CRM-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'CRM'
})

// Create ERP
CREATE (erp4_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.33.1',
host:'ERP-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'ERP'
})
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// Create Data Warehouse
CREATE (datawarehouse4_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.34.1',
host:'DATA-WAREHOUSE',
type: 'DATABASE',
system: 'DW'
})

// Create Public Website 1
CREATE (Internet4_1:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'global.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 2
CREATE (Internet4_2:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'support.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
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system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 3
CREATE (Internet4_3:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'shop.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 4
CREATE (Internet4_4:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'training.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 5
CREATE (Internet4_5:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
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host:'partners.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Internal Website 1
CREATE (Intranet4_1:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'events.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 2
CREATE (Intranet4_2:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'intranet.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 3
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CREATE (Intranet4_3:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'humanresources.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm4_1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.5',
host:'WEBSERVER-1',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm4_2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.6',
host:'WEBSERVER-2',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",

135
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Database VM 1
CREATE (customerdatabase4_1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.7',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-1',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 2
CREATE (customerdatabase4_2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.8',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-2',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 3
CREATE (databasevm4_3:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.9',
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host:'ERP-DB',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 4
CREATE (dwdatabase4:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.10',
host:'DW-DATABASE',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Hardware 1
CREATE (hardware4_1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.11',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-4_1',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 2
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CREATE (hardware4_2:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.12',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-4_2',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware4_3:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.13',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-4_3',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create SAN 1
CREATE (san4_1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.14',
host:'SAN',
type: "STORAGE AREA NETWORK",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})
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// Connect CRM to Database VM 1
CREATE (crm4_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase4_1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Database VM 1
CREATE (Internet4_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase4_1),
(Internet4_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase4_1),
(Internet4_3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase4_1)

// Connect Database VM 1 to Hardware 1
CREATE (customerdatabase4_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware4_1)

// Connect Hardware 1 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware4_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san4_1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm4_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet4_1),
(webservervm4_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet4_2),
(webservervm4_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet4_3)

// Connect Internal Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm4_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet4_1),

139
(webservervm4_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet4_2),
(webservervm4_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet4_3)

// Connect Webserver VM 1 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm4_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware4_2)

// Connect Hardware 2 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware4_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san4_1)

// Connect Webserver VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm4_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware4_2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-6 to Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm4_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet4_4),
(webservervm4_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet4_5)

// Connect Database VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware4_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(customerdatabase4_2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-5 to Database VM 2
CREATE (Internet4_4)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase4_2),
(Internet4_5)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase4_2)
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// Connect Hardware 3 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware4_3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san4_1)

// Connect Database VM 3 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware4_3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(databasevm4_3)

// Connect ERP 1 to Database VM 3
CREATE (erp4_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(databasevm4_3)

// Connect Database VM 4 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware4_3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(dwdatabase4)

// Connect Data Warehouse 1 to Database VM 4
CREATE (datawarehouse4_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(dwdatabase4)

RETURN *

// Create CRM
CREATE (crm5_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.32.1',
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host:'CRM-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'CRM'
})

// Create ERP
CREATE (erp5_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.33.1',
host:'ERP-APPLICATION',
type: 'APPLICATION',
system: 'ERP'
})

// Create Data Warehouse
CREATE (datawarehouse5_1:Application {
ip:'10.10.34.1',
host:'DATA-WAREHOUSE',
type: 'DATABASE',
system: 'DW'
})

// Create Public Website 1
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CREATE (Internet5_1:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'global.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 2
CREATE (Internet5_2:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'support.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 3
CREATE (Internet5_3:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'shop.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})
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// Create Public Website 4
CREATE (Internet5_4:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'training.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Public Website 5
CREATE (Internet5_5:Internet {
ip:'10.10.35.1',
host:'partners.acme.com',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTERNET"
})

// Create Internal Website 1
CREATE (Intranet5_1:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.2',
host:'events.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
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system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 2
CREATE (Intranet5_2:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.3',
host:'intranet.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Internal Website 3
CREATE (Intranet5_3:Intranet {
ip:'10.10.35.4',
host:'humanresources.acme.net',
type: "APPLICATION",
system: "INTRANET"
})

// Create Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm5_1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.5',
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host:'WEBSERVER-1',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm5_2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.6',
host:'WEBSERVER-2',
type: "WEB SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE",
version: "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
})

// Create Database VM 1
CREATE (customerdatabase5_1:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.7',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-1',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})
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// Create Database VM 2
CREATE (customerdatabase5_2:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.8',
host:'CUSTOMER-DB-2',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 3
CREATE (databasevm5_3:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.9',
host:'ERP-DB',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Database VM 4
CREATE (dwdatabase5:VirtualMachine {
ip:'10.10.35.10',
host:'DW-DATABASE',
type: "DATABASE SERVER",
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system: "VIRTUAL MACHINE"
})

// Create Hardware 1
CREATE (hardware5_1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.11',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-5_1',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware5_2:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.12',
host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-5_2',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware5_3:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.13',
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host:'HARDWARE-SERVER-5_3',
type: "HARDWARE SERVER",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Create SAN 1
CREATE (san5_1:Hardware {
ip:'10.10.35.14',
host:'SAN',
type: "STORAGE AREA NETWORK",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

// Connect CRM to Database VM 1
CREATE (crm5_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase5_1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Database VM 1
CREATE (Internet5_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase5_1),
(Internet5_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase5_1),
(Internet5_3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase5_1)

// Connect Database VM 1 to Hardware 1
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CREATE (customerdatabase5_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware5_1)

// Connect Hardware 1 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware5_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san5_1)

// Connect Public Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm5_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet5_1),
(webservervm5_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet5_2),
(webservervm5_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet5_3)

// Connect Internal Websites 1-3 to Webserver VM 1
CREATE (webservervm5_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet5_1),
(webservervm5_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet5_2),
(webservervm5_1)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Intranet5_3)

// Connect Webserver VM 1 to Hardware 2
CREATE (webservervm5_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware5_2)

// Connect Hardware 2 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware5_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san5_1)

// Connect Webserver VM 2 to Hardware 2
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CREATE (webservervm5_2)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(hardware5_2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-6 to Webserver VM 2
CREATE (webservervm5_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet5_4),
(webservervm5_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(Internet5_5)

// Connect Database VM 2 to Hardware 2
CREATE (hardware5_2)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(customerdatabase5_2)

// Connect Public Websites 4-5 to Database VM 2
CREATE (Internet5_4)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase5_2),
(Internet5_5)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(customerdatabase5_2)

// Connect Hardware 3 to SAN 1
CREATE (hardware5_3)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(san5_1)

// Connect Database VM 3 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware5_3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(databasevm5_3)

// Connect ERP 1 to Database VM 3
CREATE (erp5_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(databasevm5_3)
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// Connect Database VM 4 to Hardware 3
CREATE (hardware5_3)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(dwdatabase5)

// Connect Data Warehouse 1 to Database VM 4
CREATE (datawarehouse5_1)-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(dwdatabase5)

RETURN *

CREATE (switch1:Switch {
name: "Switch 1",
type: "PHYSICAL SWITCH",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

CREATE (switch2_1:Switch {
name: "Switch 2",
type: "PHYSICAL SWITCH",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})
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CREATE (firewall1:Firewall {
name: "Internal Firewall 1",
type: "FIREWALL",
system: "PHYSICAL FIREWALL"
})

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 1" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-1" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 1" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 1" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-3" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.type = "PHYSICAL SWITCH" AND m.host =
"HARDWARE-SERVER-2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.type = "PHYSICAL SWITCH" AND m.host =
"HARDWARE-SERVER-3" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Internal Firewall 1" AND m.name = "Switch 1"
CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
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MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Internal Firewall 1" AND m.name = "Switch 2"
CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

CREATE (vuln1:Vulnerability {
name: "Vuln 1.1",
CVE_number: "CVE-2010-1870",
description: "Apache Struts Remote Command Execution",
port_requirements: "80",
software_requirements:"Apache Struts <2.2.0"
})

//MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" AND
m.CVE_number="CVE-2010-1870" CREATE (n)-[:ON]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.CVE_number="CVE-2010-1870" AND
m.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" CREATE (n)-[:ON]->(m)

CREATE (exploit1:Exploit {
name: "Exploit 1",
description: "Apache Struts Remote Command Execution",
software_requirements:"Apache Struts <2.2.0"
})
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MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.system="INTERNET" AND m.name="Exploit 1" CREATE
(n)-[:EXPLOITS]->(m)

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name="Exploit 1" AND m.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0"
CREATE (n)-[:VICTIM]->(m)

MATCH (n) WHERE n.version="Apache Struts 2.2.0" AND n.name="Exploit 1" AND
n.system="INTERNET" RETURN n

MATCH (exploit1:Exploit { name: "Exploit 1" })<-[:VICTIM|EXPLOITS]>(vulnmachine) RETURN *

MATCH (switchvar:Switch { name: "Switch 3" })<-[:DEPENDS_ON]->(vulnmachine)
WITH vulnmachine
MATCH p=(vulnmachine) WHERE n.type = "HARDWARE SERVER" RETURN (p)

MATCH (switchvar:Switch { name: "Switch 3" })<-[:DEPENDS_ON|ROUTES]>(vulnmachine:Hardware)
WITH vulnmachine
MATCH (vulnmachine)<-[:DEPENDS_ON]-(webserver)<-[VICTIM|EXPLOITS]>(exploiter)
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WHERE webserver.version = "Apache Struts 2.2.0"
RETURN *

//--------------------------------------------------

CREATE (switch1:Switch {
name: "Switch 1",
type: "PHYSICAL SWITCH",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

CREATE (switch2_1:Switch {
name: "Switch 2",
type: "PHYSICAL SWITCH",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
})

CREATE (switch3_1:Switch {
name: "Switch 3",
type: "PHYSICAL SWITCH",
system: "PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE"
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})

CREATE (firewall2:Firewall {
name: "Internal Firewall 2",
type: "FIREWALL",
system: "PHYSICAL FIREWALL"
})

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 3" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-4_1" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 3" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-4_2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 3" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-4_3" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 3" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-5_1" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 3" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-5_2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Switch 3" AND m.host = "HARDWARESERVER-5_3" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
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MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.type = "PHYSICAL SWITCH" AND m.host =
"HARDWARE-SERVER-2" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.type = "PHYSICAL SWITCH" AND m.host =
"HARDWARE-SERVER-3" CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Internal Firewall " AND m.name = "Switch 3"
CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)
MATCH (n), (m) WHERE n.name = "Internal Firewall 1" AND m.name = "Switch 2"
CREATE (n)-[:ROUTES]->(m)

MATCH (n) where id(n) = 44 DETACH DELETE n

